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The Eurasian Economic Union: a time of crisis
Jan Strzelecki
The Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU), a project forced through by Russia which links it to 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia and Kyrgyzstan, is currently struggling with serious problems. 
The economic crisis in Russia – mainly caused by the fall in the price of oil on world markets 
and increased by sanctions imposed by Western countries in connection with the Ukraine 
conflict – is affecting these uncompetitive post-Soviet economies which are dependent on 
Russia. This has resulted in increased economic and political tension among the members of 
the EaEU. From Russia’s point of view, however, the EaEU project remains useful, because it 
is not economic integration that is Moscow’s priority. The Union remains its most important 
instrument for implementing the Kremlin’s geo-political objectives, in particular maintaining 
its sphere of influence and preventing post-Soviet countries from integrating with the West, 
as well as restricting their rapprochement with China. Moscow is pushing for the EaEU to 
include new countries, strengthening its tools for political dominance within the Union, and 
promoting its project on the international stage. However, the future of this project will de-
pend on both the continued determination of the Kremlin, and whether the other countries 
can change the rules for integration by taking advantage of the current crisis. 
Moscow’s goals
The Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) was formed 
on 1 January 2015 as a result of the transfor-
mation of the Customs Union and the Common 
Economic Space. From the Kremlin’s point of 
view, it is now the most important formal mech-
anism for cooperation in the post-Soviet area. In 
Moscow’s eyes the EaEU has three main func-
tions. First, it is intended as a mechanism for 
strengthening Russian influence in the region. 
Secondly, it is to serve as a barrier preventing 
the integration of the countries in this region 
with the West, and prevent the rising influence 
of China in Central Asia. Thirdly, as an expression 
of the primacy of Russia in the post-Soviet area, 
the EaEU also has the function of legitimising 
the Kremlin elite to Russian society. 
The Eurasian Economic Union, in which the 
Kremlin has the final say, remains an essential 
tool for Russia’s political influence on the other 
member states. Under the guise of integrating 
equal countries within the framework of an in-
ternational organisation, it is in fact a project for 
Moscow’s dominance of the post-Soviet area. 
The formally established institutions within the 
EaEU serve merely as a façade, and have a limit-
ed impact on economic and political processes. 
For Russia, they are another forum wherein the 
Kremlin may exploit its military and economic 
advantages to put pressure on the leaders of 
individual countries. The Kremlin’s interests 
are of key importance in the decision-making 
process, and Moscow has succeeded in en-
tangling the member states into cooperating 
more closely in the political dimension, which 
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formally is secondary to the economic aspect1. 
The most common method for the other mem-
ber states to escape from Russian dominance 
is to simulate integration into the EaEU, and 
delay the implementation of its decisions.
The EaEU project was developed in parallel with 
the intensification of European programmes in 
the post-Soviet area2. Thus it is also a response 
to the structural strength of the European 
Union, which is manifested in its ability to re-
define the framework of international relations, 
and the political and economic systems of the 
neighbouring countries. For Russia the EaEU is 
an instrument in a geopolitical game, aiming to 
prevent countries which once belonged to the 
Soviet Union (except the Baltic States) from in-
tegrating with Western structures. To this end, 
Moscow is trying to present the EaEU as an al-
ternative project to the EU, and is working to 
achieve legitimacy for the EaEU internationally. 
The Kremlin has primarily been pushing to insti-
1 Russian capacity of pushing its own solutions is also in-
creased by the fact that in the Eurasian Economic Com-
mission, which is the permanent body of the Union, the 
overwhelming majority of civil servants are citizens of 
Russia. Iwona Wiśniewska, ‘Eurasian integration. Russia’s 
attempt at the economic unification of the Post-Soviet 
area’, OSW Studies, 30 July 2013: http://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2013-07-30/eurasian-inte-
gration-russias-attempt-economic-unification-post]
2 The shape of Russia’s Eurasian project was drawn up 
during the development of the EU’s programmes in 
Eastern Europe, in particular the Eastern Partnership 
programme addressed to post-Soviet states, which – 
like the establishment of the Customs Union between 
Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus – was launched in 2009. 
From the start, Russian leaders and columnists have 
tried to portray Eurasian integration as analogous to in-
tegration within the framework of the European Union; 
see for example Vladimir Putin’s interview of 3 October 
2011 for Izvestia (http://izvestia.ru/news/502761)
tutionalise relations between the EaEU and the 
European Union, in an effort to encourage the 
EU to establish permanent mechanisms for dia-
logue with the EaEU on economic and political 
matters. Russia has demanded that the West 
recognise the EaEU as a partner in the talks on 
ending the conflict in Ukraine, and during talks 
with Brussels it has also pushed to establish of-
ficial relations between the Moscow-dominat-
ed EaEU and the EU. Such formal mechanisms 
for cooperation are intended on the one hand 
to serve as a tool to put pressure on EaEU mem-
bers, by showing that Russia has the final word 
on key issues related to international relations 
in the region; and on the other hand, that it 
is still a platform for negotiation and a tool 
to influence the countries of the West. At the 
same time, due to the rising influence of China 
in Central Asia, Moscow is trying to exploit the 
EaEU as an entity in talks with Beijing3. 
Russia promotes the EaEU as an alliance which 
can compete with the EU in the economic di-
mension, and at the same time as being axi-
ologically different from Western structures, 
by its distinctness from the principles of lib-
eral democracy and its roots in conservative 
values. Moscow stresses the specificity of the 
socio-political model of the post-Soviet states, 
which results in these countries’ inability to in-
tegrate with the West. To this end, it employs 
a narrative about the civilisational distinctiveness 
of the so-called Russian world (Russkiy Mir)4. 
An example of this can be found in the words 
of Vladimir Putin, who has stated that “the Eur-
asian Union is a project to preserve the identity 
of the peoples of the historical Eurasian space 
3 On 9 May 2015, a Russian-Chinese statement on coop-
eration in the Russian Eurasian Economic Union project 
and the Chinese New Silk Road project was signed in 
Moscow. The most important parts of the document 
concern Russian support for routes to Europe built by 
China, and the Chinese declaration of starting talks 
about the shape of an agreement for commercial and 
economic cooperation with the EaEU.
4 This concept is used in many senses in Russian discourse, 
most commonly to describe the community of people 
who speak Russian and identify with Russian culture.
For Russia the EaEU is an instrument in 
a geopolitical game, which is intended to 
prevent states which were formerly part 
of the Soviet Union from integrating with 
Western structures.
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in the new century and in the new world. Eur-
asian integration is an opportunity for the en-
tire post-Soviet area to become an independent 
centre of global development, and not just the 
periphery to Europe or Asia”5. This narrative is 
also domestically important for the Kremlin. 
It mobilises symbolic resources and highlights 
the successes of Russian foreign policy for do-
mestic purposes6. The stability of the system 
of power in Russia, in the perception of the 
Russian elite, is closely linked to the stability 
of the other post-Soviet regimes. For this rea-
son the EaEU, as a project which binds the 
elites of these countries in their dependence on 
Moscow, is intended on the one hand to pre-
vent ‘colour revolutions’ taking place in its im-
mediate neighbourhood, and on the other to 
strengthen the sustainability of the system of 
power in Russia itself. 
Expansion at the expense of the economy
The main tasks which Moscow has set for the 
EaEU demand its expansion. The Kremlin has 
consistently worked to join more countries to 
the Union, regardless of their economic con-
dition and the lukewarm opposition from the 
EaEU’s current members. In January 2015 Ar-
menia joined the Union; Kyrgyzstan did so in 
May 2015; and Tajikistan will most likely join in 
5 Putin’s speech at the meeting of the Valdai Club in 
September 2013; transcript available at http://www.rg.
ru/2013/09/19/stenogramma-site.html 
6 According to a study by the Levada Centre, the percent-
age of Russians who are proud of their country’s polit-
ical position in the world has risen from 46% in 2012 
to 68% by 2015. http://www.levada.ru/2015/12/07/gor-
dost-patriotizm-i-otvetstvennost/ 
2016. Expanding the EaEU, on the one hand, 
validates this initiative and strengthens Rus-
sian dominance over an increasing part of the 
post-Soviet area; but on the other hand it re-
duces the economic viability of the Union itself.
By pushing for the expansion of the EaEU, the 
Kremlin is skilfully exploiting the other mem-
bers’ dependence on Russia. Moscow effec-
tively forced the President of Armenia, Serzh 
Sarkisian, to opt out of European integration 
and join the EaEU, probably by using its posi-
tion as the guarantor of security for Armenia 
as an instrument of pressure, in the face of 
the country’s conflict with Azerbaijan over Na-
gorno-Karabakh, which has been smouldering 
for years. Belarus and Kazakhstan were initially 
unwilling to dilute the EaEU’s economic effec-
tiveness by adding Armenia and Kyrgyzstan. 
Moreover Kazakhstan feared that as a result of 
the enlargement, Kyrgyzstan’s role as a re-ex-
porter of goods from China would be strength-
ened, and the inflow of economic migrants 
and cheaper products from Kyrgyzstan would 
increase. However, the existing members of the 
EaEU were unable to block its inconvenient ex-
pansion. The Kremlin’s political power was also 
demonstrated by its ability to place the mem-
bership of Tajikistan on the agenda, as well as 
the more distant prospect of Azerbaijan join-
ing. Fear of reprisals from Moscow means that 
integration is primarily a political necessity for 
the new members of the Union. Membership in 
the EaEU also allows them to obtain immedi-
ate financial advantages. Yerevan, Bishkek and 
Dushanbe have realised that joining the EaEU 
has been linked to a number of negative con-
sequences for their economies, including price 
rises, caused primarily by increases in customs 
duties, and declining competitiveness, which 
could lead to the collapse of many companies7. 
For Kyrgyzstan, the increase in customs duties 
7 In the period leading up to accession, the government of 
Kyrgyzstan repeatedly discussed the EaEU with notable 
coolness; for example on 27 October 2014, the President 
of Kyrgyzstan Almazbek Atambayev called joining the 
Economic Union “a lesser evil”. http://tass.ru/mezhdun-
arodnaya-panorama/1534233 
Extending the EaEU would on the one hand 
validate the initiative and consolidate 
Russian dominance over an increasingly 
large part of the post-Soviet area, while 
on the other hand reducing the economic 
viability of the Union itself.
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on goods from China have proved to be espe-
cially painful, as re-export of these goods is an 
important source of income. These costs are 
supposedly being rewarded by ad hoc financial 
assistance from Moscow, the abolition of cus-
toms duties within the EaEU, and the opening 
of the labour markets in Russia and Kazakhstan. 
For the regimes in the EaEU countries, member-
ship also brings political benefits offsetting the 
risk of protests, as the short-term financial sup-
port allows them to discharge social tensions, 
and fear of Russian intervention limits any 
pro-Western and pro-democratic movements. 
Taking on countries with low economic poten-
tial has not strengthened the EaEU economical-
ly. Russia has used the series of transformations 
and expansions to extend its supremacy over 
these post-Soviet countries, and to demonstrate 
the success of its integration project, which is 
intended to offer an alternative to integration 
with the West. In this way, Russia is trying to 
build a narrative of a ‘multi-polar’ international 
order, which is intended to function as a sys-
tem of balance between powers which respect 
each other’s interests and spheres of influence. 
In the light of the Kremlin’s main objectives, 
the EaEU has been effective, because even in 
an economically weakened state, it seems to 
have prevented its members from joining other 
integration structures unacceptable to Moscow. 
At the same time, Russia regularly raises the 
subject of strengthening mechanisms with-
in the EaEU’s structure that would bolster its 
political dimension, and by extension Russian 
supremacy within it (such as the establishment 
of a parliament, a move away from payments 
in US dollars, and creating a single currency 
within the EaEU). These attempts have met with 
resistance from other members of the Union, 
as demonstrated in numerous statements by 
Presidents Aleksandr Lukashenko and Nursul-
tan Nazarbayev questioning the need to deep-
en Eurasian integration.
Echoes of the Russian crisis
The fall in the price of oil, which is a major Rus-
sian export commodity and a source of budget 
revenue8, and to a lesser extent the Western 
sanctions introduced in connection with the 
Ukraine conflict, have led to a rapid deteriora-
tion of the economic situation in Russia. This 
crisis also affects the weak economies of the 
other member states of the EaEU, which has 
caused conflict within the Union.
Clearly the impact of Russia’s economic prob-
lems results primarily from the historically 
strong ties between the economic systems in 
the post-Soviet area. Moreover, this impact has 
been aggravated by the large economic dispar-
ities between the members of the EaEU: Rus-
sia’s gross domestic product represents about 
86% of the GDP of the entire EaEU; the GDP 
of Kazakhstan, the second biggest in terms of 
size and economic potential, represents less 
than 10%, Belarus approximately 3.5%, and Ar-
menia and Kyrgyzstan less than 1% together9. 
In addition, trade relations within the EaEU 
are heavily dominated by individual countries’ 
trade with Russia (predominantly exports from 
Russia). This means the Union’s members are 
largely dependent on the health of the Russian 
8 Profits from oil and gas exports constitute about 75% 
of the proceeds from all Russian exports, which through 
taxation provides more than half of the proceeds to the 
state budget. Dependence on the export of raw mate-
rials means that the economy, and with it also the state 
budget and political stability in Russia, are strongly 
linked to the prices of gas and oil on world markets. Ac-
cording to calculations by the Economic Expert Group, 
a Russian consulting company, an annual drop in the 
price of a barrel of crude by US$1 causes a loss of US$2.3 
billion to the state budget.
9 http://www.eurasiancommission.org/
The economic crisis in Russia is reflected 
in the condition of the economies of the 
other EaEU member states, which are de-
pendent on Russia; this will cause econom-
ic and political conflicts within the Union.
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economy, and consequently they merely play 
a supporting role to Russia in the decision-mak-
ing process. The differences in size of the EaEU 
states’ economies, and the ‘concentric’ nature 
of trade within the EaEU, mean that tensions 
concerning economic policy are to some degree 
structurally embedded in the functioning of the 
project (see Appendix).
The recession in Russia has strongly affected 
the value of trade among the EaEU countries. 
Although the Kremlin has stated that econom-
ic cooperation within the EaEU is a priority for 
Russia, trade with the EaEU countries makes up 
only 6.6% of Russian international trade, while 
the EU represents 49.5% of Russia’s trade10. 
The continuing low rate of the rouble has also 
intermittently reduced the competitiveness of 
those producers who incur expenses in other 
currencies; this means that within the EaEU the 
value of imports to Russia has fallen more than 
exports of Russian goods. Exporters from Ka-
zakhstan have noted particularly severe losses, 
especially manufacturers of cars, building ma-
terials, foodstuffs and oil-derived goods. The 
Russian crisis, as characterised by the fall in the 
value of the rouble, reduced investment and 
10 The sharp falls in trade relate primarily to the value of 
the goods, and are largely associated with a decrease 
in the value of currencies in the post-Soviet area: in the 
first quarter of 2015, soon after the official formation of 
the EaEU, Russia’s trade flows with the member coun-
tries were a third lower than a year earlier. This decline 
particularly concerned imports to Russia (compared to 
the first quarter of 2014, imports amounted to 57%). 
The amount of goods exchanged is only slightly low-
er than before the advent of the crisis: see http://cus-
toms.ru/index2.php?option=com_content&view=arti-
cle&id=21240&Itemid=1976 
a clear decline in the real income of the popula-
tion, has also led to a sharp reduction in mon-
ey transfers from emigrants working in Russia. 
Within the EaEU, the fall in these revenues has 
turned out to be most severe for the countries 
most dependent on remittances, namely Kyr-
gyzstan and Armenia. In Kyrgyzstan, where ac-
cording to the World Bank 30% of GDP is made 
up of transfers from economic migrants, there 
was a drop in this figure of over 45% in the first 
three quarters of 2015 compared with the same 
period in 2014. Meanwhile in Armenia, where 
around 18% of GDP is made up of remittanc-
es from guest workers, transfers fell by around 
50% during the same period11. The decrease in 
the income of migrants and the imposition of 
the Russian crisis on the systemic problems of 
the EaEU economies, along with the deteriora-
tion of the economic situation, has led to a rise 
in social tensions, and anxiety among the ruling 
elites about the future of these countries’ polit-
ical systems.
The impact of the Russian economic crisis, and 
the introduction of Russia’s embargo on food 
products from Western countries, has actual-
ly weakened integration within the EaEU the 
economic sphere rather than strengthened it, 
which has caused numerous conflicts. At the 
same time, the strong impact of the Russian 
crisis on the other Union economies testifies 
to the strength of the economic ties within 
it. However, economic links within the Union 
primarily consist of bilateral links with Russia 
and are largely a historical legacy, and not – as 
presented in the Russian narrative – a result of 
the success of integration within the Eurasian 
Economic Union12. 
11 http://www.cbr.ru/statistics/?Prtid=svs&ch=TGO_sp_
post#CheckedItem
12 In the period from January to November 2015, almost 
97% of the value of trade in the EaEU area consisted 
of bilateral trade involving Russia. Details of trading be-
tween the members of the EaEU are available at: http://
www.eurasiancommission.org/ru/act/integr_i_makro-
ec/dep_stat/tradestat/analytics/Documents/express/
Nov2015.pdf
The deteriorating economic situation 
has led to attempts to restrict the free 
movement of goods by means of various 
non-tariff barriers, which are being used 
to bypass the principles of the common 
market within the EaEU.
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Conflicts within the EaEU
The imposition of the Russian crisis on the sys-
temic problems of the EaEU’s economies will 
lead to the accumulation of conflicts between 
member states. The multitude of non-tariff 
barriers and the low insttitutional culture of 
these countries have contributed to the emer-
gence of trade wars and attempts by the Union 
members to weaken the level of integration. 
The continual outbreak of such disputes shows 
that the EaEU’s economic condition primarily 
derives from the state of the Russian economy 
and Moscow’s ability to impose its will on the 
Union’s other members. 
In order to defend themselves against the ef-
fects of the crisis and the dictates of Moscow, 
some EaEU members have begun to use protec-
tionist instruments. At the beginning of 2015 
Belarus and Kazakhstan introduced reductions 
in the imports of certain products from Russia, 
in order to defend their markets against an in-
flux of Russian goods, the prices of which had 
dropped significantly as a result of the deval-
uation of the rouble. On several occasions the 
leaders of both countries have spoken sharply 
on the adverse effects of Eurasian integration 
and the losses to their countries’ economies due 
to the crisis in Russia13. This tension has resulted 
13 For example, on 1 June 2015 Aleksandr Lukashenko stat-
ed that as of that moment, the crisis-related losses to 
the Belarusian economy linked to the crisis in Russia, the 
sanctions imposed by the West on Russia, and Russian 
retaliatory sanctions amounted to almost US$3 billion. 
The losses for Belarus were associated with a decrease in 
both the trade between Belarus & Russia, and a reduc-
tion of revenues relating to transit and re-export.
in attempts to limit the freedom of movement 
of specific goods by applying non-tariff barri-
ers, which are used to circumvent the rules of 
the common market within the framework of 
the EaEU14. In addition, the decline in income 
of the general population has brought forth 
growing social frustration, which could lead to 
protests (as in June 2015 in Armenia, after the 
announcement of a rise in electricity prices), 
something which will further deepen the anxi-
ety of local elites.
The EaEU countries’ economic situation has 
been worsened by Russia’s ban on the import 
of selected products from countries which have 
introduced sanctions since Russia’s aggression 
towards Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea. 
This embargo, which was introduced by Mos-
cow without consulting the other members of 
the EaEU, has significantly affected the func-
tioning of the goods market in the EaEU area. 
The other members of the Union did not join 
in with Moscow’s ‘counter-sanctions’; this be-
came another field of conflict, and marked 
the beginning of a series of accusations that 
Belarus and Kazakhstan had failed to comply 
with Russian regulations. These two countries, 
in order to minimise the losses resulting from 
a decrease in export of their own goods to Rus-
sia, have begun to re-export Western products. 
To this end, the real origin of the goods is of-
ten concealed, and sometimes they are illegal-
ly imported onto the territory of the Russian 
Federation under the pretext of transit from 
Belarus to Kazakhstan. This has met with oppo-
sition from Moscow, which is pushing to stop 
the influx of Western food through the territo-
ry of other Union members, and has begun to 
apply increased sanitary, veterinary and trans-
port checks in order to counteract the import 
of goods from the countries covered by the 
‘counter-sanctions’.
14 Examples of such actions include Kazakhstan’s limiting 
of Russian food imports at the beginning of 2015 un-
der the pretext of sanitary and veterinary requirements, 
after the Russian rouble significantly lost value relative 
to the Kazakh currency, the tenge.
The imposition of the Russian crisis on the 
systemic problems of the EaEU countries’ 
economies, including the deterioration of 
the economic situation, will lead to so-
cial tension and anxiety among the ruling 
elites about the future of these countries’ 
political systems.
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The tensions in the Eurasian Economic Union 
were further strengthened by the accession 
of Kazakhstan to the World Trade Organisa-
tion (WTO). The conditions for Kazakhstan’s 
accession include an average customs duty of 
6.1%; this is significantly less than the rates 
adopted by the EaEU, which suited the terms 
of Russia’s accession to the WTO (an average 
duty of 10.4%). Kazakhstan has thus returned 
to the level similar to that which applied to the 
country before 2010, when it began to operate 
a common customs duty with Russia and Belar-
us. This poses a risk to the other EaEU countries 
(primarily Russia) that goods will be imported 
to the EaEU mainly via Kazakhstan. To prevent 
this, changes in the operation of the common 
market have been introduced, which establish 
two parallel customs systems: imports onto the 
domestic market in Kazakhstan with lower cus-
toms duties, according to its agreement with 
the WTO; and imports onto the EaEU market, 
while maintaining the existing EaEU duties. 
However, Kazakhstan has been obliged to in-
troduce mechanisms to prevent products cov-
ered by lower duties from being transported 
to the other EaEU member states15. Kazakh-
stan’s accession to the WTO will likely cause 
a further weakening of economic relations 
within the framework of the EaEU’s rules by re-
stricting the free movement of goods. This may 
also lead to periodic trade wars, if the goods 
imported into Kazakhstan from third countries 
are then transported into the EaEU. 
Economic integration within the EaEU has 
weakened in connection with the effects of the 
Russian crisis. It has revealed and deepened the 
problems in cooperation within the EaEU, which 
are related to uneven economic growth, the 
lack of coordination in macroeconomic policy, 
significant fluctuations in exchange rates, and 
above all, the proliferation and randomness of 
use of non-tariff barriers. For some members of 
the EaEU, however, the crisis has also brought 
15 http: //www.pravo.by/main.aspx?guid=12551&p0= 
F71500373&p1=1
an opportunity to try to redefine the conditions 
imposed by their membership in the Union: 
to obtain subsidies and loans, in the case of Be-
larus, and to improve foreign trade, in the case 
of Kazakhstan. 
Prospects
The economic condition of the EaEU depends 
primarily on the state of the Russian economy. 
In connection with the economic crisis, which 
has arisen principally because of the fall in oil 
prices on world markets, and also to some 
extent Western sanctions, Russia is unable to 
build up the Union’s economic potential. The 
continuing crisis in Russia will therefore contin-
ue to jeopardise the economic situation of the 
other EaEU states. As a result of the EaEU’s de-
clining economic attractiveness, these countries 
will remain reluctant to deepen their economic 
integration with and imposed political submis-
sion to the Kremlin16. Kazakhstan, Belarus, Ar-
menia and Kyrgyzstan will attempt to protect 
their own markets and obstruct Russian plans 
to strengthen its dominance. 
Due to the member countries’ conflicting in-
terests, plans to create a joint energy and 
raw materials market and a monetary union, 
as announced by Putin in Astana on 20 March 
2015, should be considered unrealistic17. Rus-
sia’s war against Ukraine also de facto rules 
out the chances of Ukraine joining the EaEU18, 
16 For example, in a TV interview on 24 August 2014 the 
President of Kazakhstan stated that Astana may opt out 
of membership in the EaEU, if “membership threatens 
the independence of the country.”
17 The creation of a monetary union would considerably re-
duce the competitiveness of the other EaEU countries and 
deepen their political and economic dependence on Russia.
18 The results of extensive research conducted by Rating 
Group Ukraine in November 2015 in Ukrainian cities on 
behalf of the US-based International Republican Institute 
(IRI) clearly show that, despite the disappointment in the 
post-Maidan authorities among Ukrainian society, the 
Eurasian Economic Union had substantially lost populari-
ty, and only 15% of those polled would like Ukraine to join 
the organisation, while 57% of respondents were in fa-
vour of Ukraine’s accession to the EU (the survey was only 
conducted in areas controlled by Kiev); http://www.iri.
org/sites/default/files/wysiwyg/2015_11_national_over-
sample_en_combined_natl_and_donbas_v3.pdf 
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which was one of the Kremlin’s main objectives 
when the integration project was founded. 
It is necessary to further extend the EaEU, and 
reinforce its ties in the political, economic and 
military fields, in order to carry out Russia’s 
geopolitical project of restoring its unques-
tioned control over the post-Soviet area. Hence, 
Russia will seek to extend the EaEU to include 
Tajikistan, and work to strengthen its influence 
on the foreign policy of the EaEU countries. 
Despite the growing economic problems and 
political tensions, it seems that in the political 
dimension, the EaEU project will continue to 
serve the strengthening of Russia’s dominance 
over a growing number of countries of the 
former USSR.
The GDP of the EaEU members (2014) and their trade within the EaEU 
(January-November 2015)
GDP in 2014 
(billion US$)
Country’s GDP share 
in the GDP 
of the entire EaEU 
(2014)
Trade with EaEU 
countries during 
January-November 
2015 
(million US$) 
Share of trade with 
Russia in trade with 
EaEU countries during 
January-November 
2015 
Armenia 10.9 0.5% 1179 96.9%
Belarus 75.9 3.5% 24503.8 97.4%
Kazakhstan 212.2 9.7% 15212.9 91.9%
Kyrgyzstan 7.4 0.3% 2058.8 63.9%
Russia 1 880.6 86.0% 40300.7
Total 2 187.0 100.0%
Source: the Eurasian Economic Commission, http://www.eurasiancommission.org
Appendix
